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HERE WE GO AGAIN: ARE THE FEDERAL
DISCOVERY RULES REALLY IN NEED OF
AMENDMENT?
PAUL V. NIEMEYER*
Why is it that the Civil Rules Advisory Committee is again address-
ing questions about the adequacy of the discovery rules? Has the path
to this site not been well traveled, and should not the Committee
simply let the discovery rules settle into a harmony that comes from
repeated practice? Indeed, are we not aware of the persuasive indica-
tors that the discovery rules are not broken? These questions are
appropriate to ask about the Committee's recent overture into the
discovery rules, and the answers provide not insubstantial reasons for
leaving discovery alone, even with its warts. Notwithstanding that intui-
tion, questions have persisted for the last twenty-five years, suggesting
that the Committee take another look at repeated complaints about
the discovery rules and that its look be a comprehensive examination
because the complaints reach directly to the nature and quality of the
dispute resolution process in America. These persisting questions are:
1. When fully used, is the discovery process too expensive for
what it contributes to the dispute resolution process; and
2. Are there rules changes that can be made which might
reduce the cost and delay of discovery without undermining
a policy of full disclosure?
* United States Circuit Judge, Fourth Circuit; Chair, Civil Rules Advisory Committee.
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Also, because of recent changes in the law, another look at the
discovery rules may be warranted. Because of local district court
management plans required by the Civil justice Reform Act of 1990,
and the changes to the discovery rules adopted in 1993 on an
experimental basis to provide authority for district courts to opt out
of certain discovery rules, a third question has arisen:
3. Should the federal rules for discovery, applying to cases
involving national substantive law and procedure, be made
uniform throughout the United States?
In the judgment of lawyers outside the United States, American
rules providing for expansive and extensive discovery are an oddity.
Even to American observers of the legal system, the cost of pretrial
discovery often appears to be out of proportion to the contribution it
makes to the dispute resolution process. Indeed, in August 1991, the
President's Council on Competitiveness issued a report claiming that
"folver 80 percent of the time and cost of a typical lawsuit involves
pre-trial examination of facts through discovery."' While I am not
aware of any empirical data to support this claim, the fact that the claim
was made and is often repeated by others, many of whom are users of
the discovery rules, raises a question of whether the system pays too
high a price for the policy of full disclosure in civil litigation.
The authority for expansive discovery comes from a series of
amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, adopted in 1946,
1963, 1966 and 1970 to give greater effect to the 1938 rules experiment
characterized by notice pleading coupled with broad discovery to flesh
out claims. While the 1938 rules shifted procedural battles, perhaps
unwittingly, from pleading to discovery, they deliberately hoped to shift
resolution of these disputes from court disposition of pleadings and
motions to attorney-managed discovery. As enigmatic as this idea might
be in the context of an adversarial system, it was accepted as a well-in-
tentioned experiment to replace the highly formalistic code pleading.
The idea, however, has now evolved into an expensive procedural
process because of both the continual expansion of discovery rights
and the recent explosion of information, data and record-keeping. By
1970, when the breadth of discovery had reached its zenith, the dis-
covery mantra of the rules and court decisions was full disclosure with
error resolved on the side of requiring more disclosure. When such a
policy is applied to the geometrically increased number of records and
See generally President's Council on Competitiveness, Agenda for Civil Justice Reform in
America (1991).
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amount of data now maintained, the foreseeable problems based on
burden began to appear. Since 1970, efforts have been undertaken to
curtail the expansiveness of discovery, but they have either failed or
been so diluted as to have little effect. The rules changes in 1980, 1983
and 1993 were aimed in this direction.
In 1977, the American Bar Association ("ABA") embarked on a
major effort to persuade the Civil Rules Advisory Committee to restrict
the broad scope of discovery defined by Rule 26, but its recommenda-
tion, even though initially accepted, was later rejected by the Commit-
tee in 1980, a rejection that three Justices of the Supreme Court
thought to be a mistake. Those same proposals were made again in
1996 by the American College of Trial Lawyers, and that organization
now proposes a singular change that revisits the ABA proposal by
amending Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b) (1) as follows:
Parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privi-
leged, which is relevant to the
of [a] party.
Under this proposal, instead of gearing relevancy for discovery
purposes to "the subject matter" of litigation, the American College
proposal would gear relevancy to a specific claim or defense.
In addition to the amendments in 1980, 1983 and 1993, Congress
sought to reduce costs and delay in litigation—largely thought to
emanate from discovery—by enacting the Civil Justice Reform Act of
1990. 2 That Act encouraged experimentation in pilot districts with case
management plans, including discovery plans. Indeed, it was in tan-
dem with that effort that the Civil Rules Advisory Committee adopted
its 1993 changes, providing for mandatory initial disclosure with a local
opt-out provision. 3
 Unfortunately, the experimentation undertaken
pursuant to the Civil Justice Reform Act and the 1993 rules amend-
ments has resulted in a balkanization of discovery rules such that
discovery procedures among the ninety-four districts of the country
are diverse. Of necessity, this lack of uniformity in procedural rules
must at times result in a lack of uniformity in the enforcement of
substantive rights.
Many urge that the scope of discovery be left as broad as possible,
arguing that broad discovery has enhanced, and perhaps even ex-
panded, enforcement of substantive rights. Particularly in the area of
claim or defense
2 28 U.S.C. §§ 471-482 (1994 & Stipp. 1 1995).
9 See FED. R. Qv, P. 26(a) (1)—(4).
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products liability, employment discrimination and consumer protec-
tion, claims have multiplied with the expectation that proof can be
established from the broad discovery authorized by the rules. Because
of the exposure to broad discovery, some argue, an unintended regu-
latory effect on conduct has resulted. While defendants, mostly corpo-
rations, have decried the intrusiveness, disruption and expense of such
broad discovery, some acknowledge, when pressed, that they would
retain broad discovery if the alternative was an additional layer of
government regulation that might follow if the full disclosure require-
ment was eliminated.
Despite any temptation to engage in this debate, the Civil Rules
Advisory Committee cannot, in any practical way, now attempt to undo
the 1938 experiment of notice pleading coupled with broad discovery
because that formula has become embedded in the infrastructure of
American civil procedure. Thus, as a matter of prudence, the Commit-
tee must begin any endeavor with the assumptions (1) that notice
pleading is here to stay, and (2) that full disclosure through discovery
is an essential and accepted element of the dispute resolution process.
But even accepting these assumptions, questions remain about
whether full disclosure can be accomplished more efficiently. Indeed,
it is that very inefficiency that has been used as a tool to accomplish
other ends, leading to complaints of abuse.
Against this historical backdrop, one can readily conclude that the
rules of discovery are not at rest and that harmony will not reasonably
follow their continued use in the present form. In a survey of lawyers
conducted in 1997 by the Federal Judicial Center, eighty-three percent
of those responding thought that changes to discovery rules were
required. 4 While it may be a sufficient reason to reexamine the discov-
ery rules simply to end the 1993 experiment and address the balkani-
zation of discovery procedure that resulted from it, it is the persistence
of complaints and questions about the merit of broad discovery and
its expense that, at bottom, has caused the Committee to take another
look. The Committee must determine once and for all whether discov-
ery is, indeed, too expensive and whether its cost can be reduced
without substantial compromise of the full-disclosure policy. For these
reasons, as chair of the Civil Rules Advisory Committee, I initiated a
fundamental reexamination of the discovery rules in the fall of 1996
to find out if the procedure in place for providing full disclosure is too
4 See Thomas E. Willging ct al., Federal Judicial Gtr., An Empirical Study of Discovery and
Disclosure Pradice Under the 1993 Federal Rule Amendments, 39 B.C. L. REV. 525, 543 (1998).
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expensive to justify its contribution to civil process and whether amend-
ments can be adopted to make discovery more efficient and satisfying
to parties to litigation.
It should be expressly noted that I did not initiate this reexamina-
tion in order to review discovery abuse once again. While this subject
has been studied frequently and is not the object of the reexamination,
I expect that a reduction of abuse will surely follow from any beneficent
changes addressing cost and delay caused by discovery procedures. In
addition, it should be expressly noted that the Advisory Committee is
not charged to make changes for change's sake or simply because a
problem may have been discovered. The amendment process must
include two disciplined inquiries: first, to determine whether there is
a substantial problem that cannot be handled by the courts on a case
by case approach and, second, to determine whether amendments can
be made to correct the problem without causing reactive earthquakes
that would shake the foundations of civil procedure.
To pursue the Committee's efforts, I appointed a discovery sub-
committee, naming Judge David Levi as chair and Professor Rick Mar-
cus as special reporter. The discovery subcommittee ably organized the
Boston Conference which took place at Boston College Law School on
September 4-5,1997, to receive data, opinions, ideas and proposals in
preparation for the Committee's reexamination.
At the Conference, academic experts presented papers on the
historical background of discovery and the Federal Rules' approach to
it, as well as the historical efforts to constrain it. Panels of experienced
lawyers, representing both plaintiffs and defendants, discussed current
discovery practice and its weaknesses, observing principally that prob-
lems of expense centered on the length and cost of depositions and
the breadth of document production. 5
 Plaintiffs' lawyers tended to
complain more about the cost of depositions, while defendants' lawyers
focused more on the cost of document production. A panel of experi-
enced lawyers discussed the effect that the lack of uniformity has had
on discovery practice, and another panel presented proposals for re-
form.
The Committee engaged the Federal Judicial Center to study the
expense of discovery as well as related questions and to report to the
Boston Conference. The Center conducted a survey of 2000 attorneys,
receiving almost 1200 responses, analyzed the data, and reported on
the results. The data revealed, among other things, that discovery costs
5 See generally Transcript of Panel on The Advisory Committee's History of Discovery Con-
tainment, 39 B.C. L. REV. 809 (1998) [hereinafter Transcript].
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represent about fifty percent of litigation expenses and that deposi-
tions were the single greatest item of cost. As already noted, the study
also revealed that eighty-three percent of those responding wanted
changes made to the discovery rules, involving principally: (1) better
access to judges; (2) greater uniformity of discovery rules; (3) greater
sanctions for abuse; and (4) adoption of a code of civility.
The Committee also asked the RAND Institute for Civil justice to
review its broad database collected in connection with its work under
the Civil Justice Reform Act and to conduct a further analysis of that
data in order to report how well discovery works and how it might be
improved. The RAND Institute specifically analyzed the effect on dis-
covery costs of (1) early case management, (2) early disclosure, (3)
good faith efforts in resolving discovery disputes, (4) limiting inter-
rogatories, and (5) shortening discovery cutoff time. Reviewing a da-
tabase slightly different 'from that reviewed by' the Federal Judicial
Center, the RAND Institute found that for cases that were closed after
having been pending for nine months, thirty-six percent of the total
lawyer costs were attributable to discovery.' It also found that in thirty-
seven percent of general civil cases, lawyers conducted no discovery,
and in a majority of the cases, they devoted three hours or less to
discovery.? The RAND Institute's report thus revealed that in the typi-
cal case, the expense of discovery was not a problem and that such a
problem appeared only in a minority of cases. It confirmed, however,
that in that minority, discovery was extensively used and the lawyers
using it presented an "anecdotal 'parade of horribles.'"
National associations of lawyers also presented proposals for dis-
covery reform. The Conference heard from representatives of the
ABA Section of Litigation, the American College of Trial Lawyers, the
American Trial Lawyers Association, the Defense Research Institute,
the Trial Lawyers for Public Justice and the Product Liability Advisory
Council.
Finally, the Conference heard from a distinguishednguished group of
"alumni" who had worked in the past on discovery reform efforts. This
panel included former chairs and reporters of the Civil Rules Advisory
Committee, as well as others who have been involved in reform efforts
over the years.'
6 SeeJAMES S. KAKALIK ET AL., RAND INST. FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, DISCOVERY MANAGEMENT:
FURTHER ANALYSIS OF THE CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT EVALUATION DATA § II(B) (1998),
reprinted in 39 B.C. L. REv. 613 (1998) (in this issue).
7 See id. at § II(A).
8 See generally Transcript, supra note 5.
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During the Conference, which was unprecedented both in scope
and in the experience of its presenters, the current members of the
Civil Rules Advisory Committee were listeners. In particular, I took
notes with the single idea of distilling a Conference consensus about
the data, opinions, ideas, and proposals presented. The following is a
summary of my conclusions:
1. The desire for information in connection with the resolution
of civil disputes was nearly universal. No one at the Conference seemed
to advocate the elimination of requiring full disclosure of relevant
information.
2. Discovery is now working effectively and efficiently in a majority
of the cases, which represent the "routine" cases.
3. In cases where discovery was actively used, it was thought to be
unnecessarily expensive and burdensome. Plaintiffs' lawyers seemed
most concerned with the length, number and cost of depositions, and
defendants' lawyers seemed most concerned by the number of docu-
ments required in document production and the cost of selecting and
producing them.
4. In districts where initial mandatory disclosure has been prac-
ticed, it is generally liked, and the users believe that it lessens the cost
of litigation. In one sense, participants viewed initial disclosure as a
device aimed at filling the vacancy created by notice pleading,
5. There was an overwhelming and emphatic support for national
uniformity of the discovery rules, and almost all participants favored
the elimination of the local options afforded by Rule 26. There was
substantial disagreement, however, on what the national rule should
be.
6. The belief was almost universal that the cost of discovery dis-
putes could be reduced by greater judicial involvement and that the
earlier in the process that judges became involved, the better.
7. Many observed that the necessarily strict observance of the
attorney-client privilege, and the current principles defining how that
privilege is waived, added substantial time to discovery compliance.
Lawyers felt that a relaxation of the waiver rules for purposes of dis-
covery would significantly lessen costs.
8. Most believed that discovery costs could be reduced without
reducing full disclosure by adopting presumed limits on the number
and length of depositions and on the scope of discovery, particularly
in connection with the production of documents,
9. Early discovery cutoff dates and firm trial dates were recognized
as the best court management tool to reduce the costs of discovery,
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and the RAND Institute data appears to have confirmed that conclu-
sion.
The Boston Conference provided the Civil Rules Advisory Com-
mittee and, indeed, the larger legal community with an unprecedented
single source of data, historical information, ideas and proposals for
discovery reform, and this important issue of the Boston College Law
Review makes available the academic groundwork laid for that Confer-
ence. The materials included in this issue, coupled with the Commit-
tee's work-papers, which will be published shortly, will further en-
lighten the work further of the Committee and rules commentators.
While the Committee appears to be headed toward some form of
change to provide national uniformity in discovery procedures, other
changes are by no means foregone. If the Committee decides to ad-
dress the consensus distilled from the Conference proceedings, it
could consider a three-level discovery process—a Neapolitan Plan—in
which mandatory disclosure of some type is the first layer, core discov-
ery under attorney management is the second, and customized more
extensive discovery, approved by the court pursuant to a plan submit-
ted by the parties, is the third. The core discovery could be restricted
by presumed limits on the length and number of depositions and the
scope of documents subject to production, beyond which a party would
have to submit a plan to the court for approval. The Neapolitan Plan
would thus substantially leave in place, subject 'to attorney manage-
ment, the present discovery practice used for the vast majority of cases,
and would commit customized discovery to a procedure by which the
parties would have to develop a plan and submit it to the court for
approval. This would have the beneficial effect of engaging the court
in management over complex discovery where , that management is
most needed.
What appears certain is that no change will be made to the dis-
covery rules without some consensus of approval from both plaintiffs'
and defendants' attorneys. Moreover, if a change appears to be indi-
cated, the Committee will pursue it only if the Committee reasonably
expects that the benign effects of change will clearly outweigh the
negative consequences of making change. For now, the Committee
must retire to its work and take counsel from the product of the Boston
Conference and the materials in this issue of the Boston College Law
Review.
